VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism

Results: 65



#Item
21Combinatorial Auctions with Restricted Complements Ittai Abraham Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley Moshe Babaioff Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley

Combinatorial Auctions with Restricted Complements Ittai Abraham Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley Moshe Babaioff Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-04-26 10:21:18
22CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #18: Multi-Parameter Revenue-Maximization∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 5,

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #18: Multi-Parameter Revenue-Maximization∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 5,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-05-13 09:36:27
23CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #2: Unit-Demand Bidders and Walrasian Equilibria∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 8, 2014

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #2: Unit-Demand Bidders and Walrasian Equilibria∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 8, 2014

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-07-26 15:17:56
24Revenue Maximization with a Single Sample Peerapong Dhangwatnotai∗ Department of Computer Science, Stanford University 460 Gates Building, 353 Serra

Revenue Maximization with a Single Sample Peerapong Dhangwatnotai∗ Department of Computer Science, Stanford University 460 Gates Building, 353 Serra

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Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com

Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34
25Supply-Limiting Mechanisms TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University QIQI YAN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford U

Supply-Limiting Mechanisms TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University QIQI YAN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford U

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Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com

Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:35
26Optimal Mechanism Design and Money Burning Jason D. Hartline∗ Tim Roughgarden† Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Optimal Mechanism Design and Money Burning Jason D. Hartline∗ Tim Roughgarden† Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2008-03-17 23:29:32
27CS364B: Exercise Set #4 Due by the beginning of class on Wednesday, February 5, 2014 Instructions: (1) Turn in your solutions to all of the following exercises directly to one of the TA (Okke). Please type your solutions

CS364B: Exercise Set #4 Due by the beginning of class on Wednesday, February 5, 2014 Instructions: (1) Turn in your solutions to all of the following exercises directly to one of the TA (Okke). Please type your solutions

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-01-31 23:29:10
28Learning About The Future and Dynamic E¢ ciency Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu1We

Learning About The Future and Dynamic E¢ ciency Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu1We

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
29Learning About The Future and Dynamic E¢ ciency Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu1We

Learning About The Future and Dynamic E¢ ciency Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu1We

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
30Approximation and Collusion in Multicast Cost Sharing 1 Aaron Archer2 Cornell University, Operations Research Dept., Ithaca, NYE-mail: and Joan Feigenbaum3 Arvind Krishnamurthy4 Rahul Sami

Approximation and Collusion in Multicast Cost Sharing 1 Aaron Archer2 Cornell University, Operations Research Dept., Ithaca, NYE-mail: and Joan Feigenbaum3 Arvind Krishnamurthy4 Rahul Sami

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Source URL: cs-www.cs.yale.edu

Language: English - Date: 2004-03-26 13:36:19